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GOOD JOBS, BAD JOBS AND REDISTRIBUTION
Abstract
We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the government is
concerned about the distribution of labour income. Income inequality is caused by the
presence of sunk capital investments, which creates a ‘good jobs’ sector due to the capture of
quasi-rents by trade unions. We find that whether the government should subsidise or tax
investments is crucially dependent on union bargaining strength. If unions are weak, the
optimal tax policy implies a combination of investment taxes and progressive income
taxation. On the other hand, if unions are strong, we find that the best option for the
government is to use investment subsidies in combination with either progressive or
proportional taxation, the latter being the optimal policy if the government is not too
concerned about inequality and if the cost of income taxation is sufficiently high.
JEL Code: H2, J42, J51.
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper concerns itself with redistribution policy speciﬁcally and opti-
mal taxation more generally in a dual labour market setting. We portray
the economy as divided in a primary ‘good jobs’ sector and a secondary
sector with ‘bad jobs’. The good jobs sector is characterised by sunk
capital investments and by the fact that labour, by forming a trade
union or otherwise, manages to capture parts of the quasi-rents that
are generated. The good jobs sector is ‘good’ because wages are higher
there, and all workers would prefer a good job if they could only get one.
In turn, the fact that labour captures quasi-rents will typically lead to
underinvestment and a too small primary sector, as in Grout (1984) and
Manning (1987).
There are several options available for a government that cares about
distribution. Should the government try to tax away some of the income
of the primary sector workers and redistribute towards secondary sector
ones? Should the government instead seek to tax away the quasi-rent
from the primary sector directly through an investment tax? Or by using
ap r o ﬁt tax? Or should the government try to expand the primary sector
by subsidising investment, so that more workers can enjoy high primary
sector wages? The attempt to disentangle questions as these is the core
contents of the current work.
The literature on optimal redistributive taxation (e.g. Dixit and
Sandmo (1977), Sandmo (1983, 1998) and Parker (1999)) discusses re-
distribution in a setting with competitive labour markets. Here a high
income is typically the result of high ability, the relevant trade-oﬀ is
between more redistribution and distorted labour supply incentives. As
Sandmo (1998) stresses, without distributional concerns it is diﬃcult
even to give a welfare-theoretic justiﬁcation for the use of distortive in-
come taxation, as uniform lump-sum taxes then could be used.
There is also a large literature on trade unions, wage bargaining
and taxation.1 A key focus in many of these papers is on the eﬀect
of taxation on wage determination and employment in various model
formats. Both theoretically and empirically, results appear ambiguous.
Dual labour markets and redistributive considerations are not treated.
We know of only a few papers that study unions and tax policy in two-
1Some early papers are Oswald (1982), Layard (1982), Hersoug (1984), Malcolm-
son and Sartor (1987), Lockwood (1990) and Lockwood and Manning (1993). More
recent work include Altenburg et al. (2001), Aronsson et al. (2002), Brunello and
Sonedda (2002), Fuest and Huber (2000), Kolm (2000), Koskela and Vilmunen (1996)
and Sørensen (1999). Recent empirical evidence can be found in Brunello et al.
(2002), Hansen et al. (2000), Holmlund and Kolm (1995) and Lockwood et al.
(2000). For a survey, see Røed and Strøm (2002).
2sector models. Holmlund and Lundborg (1990) study the incidence of
diﬀerent ways of ﬁnancing unemployment beneﬁts in a Harris-Todaro
framework.2 Kleven and Sørensen (2003) study taxation in dual labour
markets with eﬃciency wages in the primary sector. This holds also
for Wauthy and Zenou (2002), who introduce educational subsidies as
a policy element. We use a diﬀerent type of dual labour market model,
with locked-in investment, and the interplay between tax progressivity
and investment subsidies/taxes will be important. Finally, we mention
Agell and Lommerud (1997), where the dual labour market framework
is close to the one used here, but where a minimum wage is the only
policy instrument.
Of related interest is the empirical literature on labour rent sharing
more speciﬁcally and ﬁrm and industry wage diﬀerentials more gener-
ally. A recent study is Margolis and Salvanes (2001), that also contains
many further references. Several of these studies support the notion that
labour shares in rents even in countries as the US where unions tend to
be weak, but contrasting views are also aired.
We will now sketch the main ﬁndings of the paper. If trade unions are
strong and a planner’s preference for equality is high, it turns out to be
the best policy to combine progressive income taxation and investment
subsidies. In the choice between trying to transfer money from primary
to secondary workers and seeking to expand the number of primary
sector jobs, one chooses both. If trade unions still are strong, but the
preference for redistribution is weaker, one will choose only to try to
expand the good-jobs sector. We ﬁnd that if income taxation becomes
more costly, this will expand the parameter space when the only policy
used is to get more people into primary sector jobs while the parameter
space where this policy is used in conjunction with progressive taxation
contracts.
Moreover, if trade unions are not very strong, the investment subsidy
policy will be abandoned to the beneﬁt of an investment tax. Expanding
the primary sector now mostly beneﬁts capitalists (that by assumption
do not count in the welfare function), which cools the desire for invest-
ment subsidies. Instead, the government seeks to capture those rents
that the union could not by taxing investment. The investment tax is
supplemented by progressive income taxation. This result, that as men-
tioned apply for low values of the union’s ability to capture rent, is only
to a minor degree inﬂuenced by the strength of the planner’s preference
for redistribution from primary to secondary workers.
2Also the framework we use has links to Harris-Todaro’s (1970) model of two-
sector developing economies, although our focus is not on wait unemployment. Calvo
(1978) introduced primary sector trade unions into the Harris-Todaro model.
3Finally, we assume that a tax on pure proﬁts is possible up to an ex-
ogenously given capped level. If the possibility of proﬁt taxation goes up,
this contracts the parameter space with investment taxation, basically
because another instrument to redistribute from capitalists to workers
now becomes available.
2M o d e l
There are two sectors in the economy; a capital-intensive ‘primary sector’
and a labour intensive ‘secondary sector’. As a simpliﬁcation we assume
that primary sector production necessitate the use of both labour and
capital, whereas self-employed labour is the only factor of production in
the secondary sector.
By forming a trade union, workers in the primary sector are able to
capture a share of the rents generated by sunk capital investments. This
is the key assumption of the model.
There are two periods in our model. In the ﬁrst period primary
sector investments, K, are sunk. For simplicity we assume a ﬁxed rela-
tionship between employment and capital in the primary sector. Thus,





where γ is a measure of the degree of capital intensity in production.
Production takes place in the second period. Workers are initially
identical, and sorting to the sectors is assumed to be arbitrary. The wage
rate in the primary sector, w1, is determined through ex-post bargaining
b e t w e e nt h eu n i o na n dt h eﬁrm(s). In the secondary sector, labour
is used in a constant-returns-to-scale process and the workers in this
sector earn w2. All workers, in both sectors, supply one unit of labour
inelastically.
2.1 Wage bargaining
Since employment is determined prior to bargaining, primary sector
workers are only concerned about maximising wages. We assume that
the number of working hours per worker in the primary sector is ﬁxed
by the employers before bargaining.3
D u et os o m ee n t r yc o s t s ,t h e r ei saﬁxed number of ﬁrms in the
primary sector. Assuming a linear revenue function, with the marginal
3If employers and unions had bargained over an hourly wage and then let workers
choose their desired work eﬀort, we would have oversupply of labour eﬀort. Working
more would for each individual worker be a way of securing more rents for himself.
4revenue of capital given by φ, the second period proﬁt of a representative
employer is
π = φK − w1L (2)
We assume Nash bargaining and let the relative bargaining strength
of the trade union be denoted by α ∈ [0,1]. Primary sector workers can
always obtain w2, so this is taken to be the threat-point of the union.
The threat-point of the ﬁrm is zero. Let t ∈ [0,1] be the marginal tax
rate on labour income. The primary sector wage rate is given by the
solution to the following problem:
max
w1
αln{(w1 − w2)(1− t)} +( 1− α)ln{φK − w1L}
which yields
w1 = w2 + α(φγ − w2) (3)
and
π =( 1− α)(φK − w2L) (4)
The equilibrium wage is given by the fall-back wage and a share in the
higher productivity of labour in the primary sector, φγ − w2.
Obviously, we have to assume that φγ >w 2. Note that pre-tax wages
does not depend on tax rates. This result depends on the linearity
assumptions of the model and means that we bypass a discussion of
questions of incidence.
Normalising the size of the total labour force to 1, the average pre-tax
labour income in the economy is given by
w = Lw1 +( 1− L)w2 (5)
2.2 Capital investments
Abstracting from discounting, the ﬁrst-period problem facing the ﬁrm is
to choose the level of investments that maximises present-value proﬁts,
given by
Π = π − C (K,s) (6)
The cost of investment depends on the amount of capital acquired and






2 − sK (7)
Using (1), (3) and (4) we ﬁnd that the optimal investment level is given
by







5Using (1), (4), (6) and (7) we also ﬁnd that





Without unionisation, the ﬁrm would be able to hire workers at the
wage w2. In this case it is easily shown that the optimal investment level
is given by
K




Thus, we see from (8) that in the absence of investment subsidies, the
presence of unions always leads to under-investment, as long as the union
has some bargaining power.
2.3 Government
In designing an optimal tax scheme a policy maker, sometimes dubbed as
‘the government’, is assumed to have three diﬀerent policy instruments
at its disposal; a proportional income tax rate (t), a uniform lump-
sum transfer to all workers (b) and a capital investment subsidy (s).
Whereas b is assumed to be non-negative, s is allowed also to take on
negative values, making it then a tax on investments. Note that t>0
in conjunction with b>0 implies progressive income taxation.
As we will return to later, we also assume that there is proﬁt taxation
in the economy, but that this rate is capped at an exogenous level, τ.
2.3.1 Welfare
The purpose of this paper is to characterise optimal policy not for any
social planner, but for a policy maker that cares for equality. This policy
maker concerns himself not only with total labour income, but cares also
for the distribution of income across the working population. Capital in-
come typically accrues disproportionately to the richest in society, so it
seems reasonable that such a policy maker would place less weight on
capital income than on labour income. To keep the analysis simple, we
make the exaggerated assumption that proﬁts do not enter the policy
maker’s objective function at all. As a by-product of this assumption,
it becomes absolutely clear that when the policy maker in some circum-
stances chooses to subsidise investments, this is only because not only
capitalists but also workers beneﬁt. A relatively simple welfare function
that has the required properties is4
W = h w(1 − βG) (11)
4The welfare function is non-welfarist in the sense that it does not build on indi-
vidual utility functions and arbitrary assumptions about cardinal properties of these
functions. The present function has also tractability advantages in the current con-
text. A social welfare function of this kind is suggested by Lambert (1993). Using
6where
h w = w(1 − t)+b
is average post-tax labour income. G ∈ [0,1] is the Gini coeﬃcient, a
standard measure of income inequality. A more equal distribution of
income would imply a lower value of G.T h ep a r a m e t e rβ ∈ [0,1) is thus
a measure of the policy maker’s aversion towards income inequality.5
In our model, the Gini coeﬃcient is given by6
G =
L(1 − L)(w1 − w2)(1− t)
h w
(12)
If the government wants to decrease income inequality, there are several
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L(1 − L)(w1 − w2)(1− t)
h w2 < 0
Thus, an increase in t or an increase in b will both contribute towards a
more equal distribution of labour income.
Another, and less obvious, option for the government is to alter the
relative share of ‘good jobs’ in the economy, for instance by subsidising
capital investments. Let e wi be post-tax labour income per worker in
sector i. An expansion of the primary sector can then be found to have




(e w1 − e w2)
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e w1L2 − e w2 (1 − L)
2
h w2
We see that a marginal expansion of the primary sector has an am-










survey data, Amiel et al (1999) ﬁnd that this functional form generally gives a better
ﬁt to individuals’ attitudes towards inequality than more traditional forms based on
constant relative or constant absolute inequality aversion.
5The assumption that β < 1 not only ensures that welfare always is positive, but
makes further sure that the welfare function is Paretian in that it obeys the Pareto
criterion. We show below that moving a worker from the bad-jobs to the good-jobs
sector always improves welfare, and it can also be shown that increasing the primary
sector wage, ceteris paribus, increases welfare.
6See Appendix A for an explicit derivation of the Gini coeﬃcient.
7This is always true if L>1
2. Thus, expanding the primary sector con-
tributes to a more equal income distribution if more than half of the
working population is already situated in this sector, or if the diﬀerence
in post-tax income between the sectors is suﬃciently high. Expanding
the good-jobs sector can be good or bad for income distribution as mea-
sured by the Gini coeﬃcient: For illustration assume that all workers
work in bad jobs, giving a good job to only one worker then makes the
income distribution more uneven. If all but one worker have good jobs,
moving this last worker to the primary sector obviously evens out the
income distribution.
Inserting the expression for G into the welfare function, we obtain
W =( 1− t)[w − βL(1 − L)(w1 − w2)] + b (13)
We can see how a marginal change in the relative sizes of the two
sectors aﬀects welfare by considering the following partial derivatives:
∂W
∂L
=(e w1 − e w2)[(1− β)+β2L] > 0
∂2W
∂L∂β
=(e w1 − e w2)(2L − 1) > (<)0 if L > (<)
1
2
A marginal expansion of the primary sector may not necessarily make
income distribution more even, but it will always increase welfare. Even
if the distribution should become more skewed, the eﬀect of the increased
average will dominate. Had this not been the case, our welfare function
would have been non-Paretian. Furthermore, if the primary sector is
larger than the secondary sector initially, the welfare gain of a further
expansion will be larger the more weight the government puts on income
e q u a l i t y .T h ec o n v e r s ew i l lb et h ec a s ei fL<1
2 initially.
To sum up this discussion, expanding the primary sector is ‘redis-
tribution policy’ at least in the imprecise sense that some previously
disadvantaged workers beneﬁt from the policy. If ‘redistribution policy’
is given the sharper meaning to decrease a spread measure of incomes
as the Gini coeﬃcient, we see that primary sector expansion is a rather
blunt instrument to achieve this goal. Such expansion does only con-
tribute to redistribution in this more narrow sense when the primary
sector is ‘large’ to begin with.
2.3.2 Budget
In order to avoid trivial solutions we must introduce impediments to the
use of tax instruments. We make the standard assumption that income
taxation is costly, and that the marginal cost of taxation is increasing.
Technically, this cost is incorporated in a very simple way by assuming
8that for every extra tax dollar levied on the working population, the
government receives 1 − λt in extra tax revenues, where λ ∈ [0,1].7
In addition to labour income taxes, there is also a proportional tax
o nt h ep r e s e n tv a l u eo fp r o ﬁts. However, we assume that ﬁrms can
evade this tax whenever the proﬁt tax rate exceeds some exogenously
given level. This feature is captured in the simplest possible way by
assuming an exogenous proﬁtt a xr a t eτ ∈ [0,1]. The two parameters λ
and τ represent the limits to taxation: Without them, tax authorities
could simply collect all income in society and redistribute after their own
liking.
With these assumptions, net government revenues are given by







tw − b − sK (14)
3 Optimal taxation




W (t,b,s;β,γ,α,φ,w 2) s.t. B (t,b,s;τ,λ,γ,α,φ,w 2) ≥ 0
Before turning to a partly graphical discussion of optimal taxation, some
insights into the mechanisms of the model can be obtained by inspection
of the ﬁrst-order conditions of the problem. Assuming that the public
budget constraint holds with equality, we can solve it for b and insert
into the maximand, thereby eliminating one choice variable.
Using (5), (13) and (14), the ﬁrst-order conditions for an interior




+ βL(1 − L)(w1 − w2)=w (15)










=( 1− λt)w (17)
7As labour supply is exogenous in the model, the cost of taxation must be thought
of as administrative costs of tax collection. In the primary sector, there is a rent
element in the wage, so workers might want to work as much as they are allowed to,
but at least in the secondary sector, income taxation will in practice inﬂuence labour
supply. Endogenous labour supply would complicate the model quite dramatically,
and we think that the present, simpler formulation with an increasing marginal cost
of taxation at least in a crude way captures the essential point that there is an
























The left hand side of (15) can be interpreted as the marginal social
beneﬁt of income taxation. The ﬁrst term is the marginal increase in
average post-tax income due to a tax-ﬁnanced increase in lump-sum
transfers, whereas the second term is the beneﬁtf r o mam o r ee q u a l
distribution of income. We see that the magnitude of this second term is
dependent on the degree of inequality aversion, the wage gap between the
sectors, and the relative size of the primary sector. The more equal the
sectors are in terms of employment, the higher is the eﬀect of increased
income taxation on reducing income inequality, as measured by the Gini
coeﬃcient.
The right hand side of (15) is the direct income loss for workers due
to a marginal increase in income taxation, which is the average pre-tax
wage. In this context, we can interpret w as the marginal social cost of
income taxation. An important observation is that if β > 0,t h em a r g i n a l
beneﬁt of income taxation always exceeds the social costs at t =0 .T h e r e
is no eﬃciency loss associated by collecting the ﬁrst income tax dollar,
and by handing out this dollar in equal portions to the entire working
population, social welfare is increased. Since complete equalisation of
income is only obtained at t =1 , this must be true irrespective of the
sizes of s and b. Thus, corner solutions with t∗ =0can be ruled out.
Now turning to the ﬁrst-order condition for the investment subsidy
(tax). If s>0, the left hand side of (16) can be interpreted as the
marginal social beneﬁt of investment subsidies. The primary social ben-
eﬁt of increasing the investment subsidy is a higher average wage, due
to the fact that a larger share of the working population is allowed into
the ‘good’ sector. The magnitude of this beneﬁt is determined by the
initial wage gap between the sectors. As already noted and which also
as can be seen from (16), if L>1
2 initially, an inﬂux of workers into the
primary sector contributes towards decreasing income inequality.
The right hand side of (16) can be interpreted as the marginal social
costs of investment subsidies. Looking at (18), the last term in the
square brackets are the direct costs of a marginal increase in s.T h e s e
costs are mitigated, however, by an increase in tax revenue when the
primary sector is expanded. Of course if s<0, the interpretation of
(16) is reversed.
We can use the above analysis to identify the diﬀerent tax regimes
in the model. We know that t∗ =0cannot be a solution as long as
β > 0. Furthermore, from the budget constraint we know that b∗ =0
must imply s∗ > 0.T h i sl e a v e su sw i t ht h r e ep o s s i b l er e g i m e s :
10Regime I: Progressive income taxation and investment subsidies (b∗ >
0, s∗ > 0)
Regime II: Proportional income taxation and investment subsidies
(b∗ =0 , s∗ > 0)
Regime III: Progressive income taxation and an investment tax (b∗ >
0, s∗ ≤ 0)
Optimal taxation in the present economy concerns basically two is-
sues: The planner has a taste for redistribution and there is also an
underinvestment problem due to the fact that labour captures parts of
quasi-rents. Regime I then seems to be a natural choice, one uses pro-
gressive taxation for redistribution purposes and investment subsidies to
expand the primary sector (which also can have beneﬁcial distributional
eﬀects). However, it is possible (regime II) that all proceeds from the in-
c o m et a xi su s e do ni n v e s t m e n ts u b s i d i e s( a n dn o to nal u m p - s u mg r a n t
to all workers). It can also be (regime III) that one uses the capital
investment in the primary sector as a tax base, knowing that this aggra-
vates the underinvestment problem, in order to pay out higher lump-sum
grants to the working population. The central question in the remainder
of the paper is when which strategy is chosen. The central parameters of
the model are labour’s rent share (α), the planner’s taste for redistribu-
tion (β), and the two measures of impediments to taxation, the income
tax collection cost parameter (λ) and the cap on proﬁtt a x a t i o n( τ). The
full analytical solution turns out to be rather messy. Instead of perform-
ing standard comparative statics experiments, our main strategy will be
to ﬁx two of these variables (the tax impediment variables) at various
given levels, and then illustrate graphically how combinations of α and
β lead optimal policy to lie in one of the three possible regimes. Before
we do this, however, we will study two special cases that we think shed
some light on the workings of the model, namely the cases where income
taxation is costless, λ =0and when the planner has no redistribution
preference, β =0 .
At this point, we make some rather innocent simpliﬁcations, by set-
ting φ =1 , γ =1and w2 =0 .T h e s e s i m p l i ﬁcations preserve all the
important mechanisms of the model. Furthermore, in order to secure an
optimal solution for the entire set of parameter values we will assume
that the exogenous proﬁtt a xr a t e ,τ,i sn o tt o oh i g h . 8
With these simpliﬁcations, the optimal taxation problem is reduced
8It can be shown that when substituting for b in the welfare function, concavity




W =( 1− t)w[1 − β (1 − L)] + b (19)
subject to







tw − b − sL ≥ 0 (20)
As forewarned, we start out by considering two ‘polar’ cases, one
in which income redistribution is costless and one in which the policy
maker has no preference for such redistribution.
3.1 Costless income taxation (λ =0 )
If income taxation is costless, then income redistribution is also costless.
We assume that the government is concerned about income distribution
at least to some small degree (β > 0). It can costlessly achieve complete
e q u a l i t yb ys e t t i n gt =1 . Setting λ =0and t =1 , the problem is
reduced to
max





(1 − α + s)(2(α − s)+τ (1 − α + s))
The ﬁrst thing to note is that β is eliminated from the problem.
This is very intuitive. The trade-oﬀ between income redistribution and
income maximisation for the whole working population is only present
when redistribution is costly. Otherwise, the optimal policy for the gov-
ernment is to collect all labour income, and hand it out as lump-sum
transfers. Thus, the optimal value of s is the one that maximises gov-










2α + τ (1 − α) − 1
2 − τ
(23)
We see that b∗ |λ=0> 0, so the optimal tax regime is either I or III,
depending on the parameter values.











Ah i g h e rp r o ﬁt tax rate, or stronger unions, increases the optimal value
of s∗. There are three potential sources of tax revenue from the pri-
mary sector: Income taxation, investment taxation and proﬁt taxation.
Increasing the investment tax (or reducing the subsidies) yields direct
revenues for the government, but the resulting contraction of the pri-
mary sector means that revenues from income and proﬁt taxation are
reduced. If unions are strong, and thus primary sector wages are high,
an expansion of the primary sector would yield a large increase in tax
revenues. The same is true if the proﬁt tax rate is high. Consequently,
it is optimal for the government to subsidise capital investments if the
relative bargaining strength of the unions, or the proﬁtt a xr a t e ,i ss u f -
ﬁciently high.
From (23) we also ﬁnd that
s
∗ |λ=0> (<)0 if α > (<)
1 − τ
2 − τ
At one extreme, if τ =0 ,t h e ns∗ |λ=0= α − 1
2.T h u s , w i t h o u t p r o ﬁt
taxation, the optimal tax policy implies investment subsidies (taxes) if
α > (<) 1
2. At the other extreme, if τ =1 ,t h e ns∗ |λ=0= α,w h i c hi s
the ﬁrst-best level of subsidies, from an eﬃciency point of view.9 Under
the assumption that proﬁt to capital owners has no value for the social
planner, any proﬁtt a xr a t eb e l o wt h ec o n ﬁscatory level means that
some part of capital revenues are wasted, from the planner’s point of
view, and thus the optimal subsidy rate implies investment below the
ﬁrst-best level.
3.2 No inequality aversion (β =0 )
If the government is not concerned about income distribution among
workers, the tax parameters are optimally set so that average labour





2(2−τ) if α ≤ 1
2











6αλ if α > 1
2
(25)
9For this special case we do not need any assumption that caps the proﬁt tax at
















ψ =4 α − 8αλ + αλ
2 +6 λ
When income inequality is not an issue for the government, the income
tax parameter t is only used when it is necessary to ﬁnance investment
subsidies, so t∗ |β=0> 0 only if α > 1
2.L i k ei nt h ec a s ew i t hλ =0 ,t h e r e
is no trade-oﬀ between income redistribution and income maximisation,
so the government’s problem is reduced to setting the tax parameters in
a way that maximises average after-tax income.
From (26) we ﬁnd that s∗ |β=0< 0 if α < 1−τ
2−τ. Consequently, there
are three possible tax regimes:
If α < 1−τ
2−τ, there is a tax on investments, and the revenues from this
tax, and the proﬁt tax, are distributed to workers as lump-sum trans-






, there are investment subsidies, and these are fully
ﬁnanced by revenues from the proﬁt tax, which also cover the lump-sum
transfer. If α > 1
2, the optimal policy also imply investment subsidies,
but these are now jointly ﬁnanced by proﬁt and income taxation, and
there are no lump-sum transfers.
3.3 Inequality aversion and costly income taxation
(λ > 0 and β > 0)
Now to the more general case when the government cares about inequal-
ity, and income taxation is costly. The optimal solution is determined
by four parameters: α, β, λ and τ. The explicit solutions, which are
rather messy, are reported in Appendix B.
We know from the previous analysis that there are three possible tax
regimes, where Regime II is a corner solution with b∗ =0 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,
Regime I also contains a possible corner solution with t =1 .I ft h ec o s t
of income taxation is suﬃc i e n t l yl o w ,c o m b i n e dw i t hac e r t a i nd e g r e eo f
inequality aversion, we know that the government will set the income
tax at the conﬁscatory level.
The three possible tax regimes are most easily characterised graphi-
cally. In Figures 1-3 we have plotted b∗ =0and s∗ =0for ﬁxed values
of the limits-to-taxation variables τ and λ, to illustrate how diﬀerent
combinations of α and β determine the optimal tax regime. Using Fig-
ure 1 as a benchmark, Figure 2 shows the eﬀect of more costly income
taxation, whereas Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of a higher proﬁtt a xr a t e .
We see that whether the government should subsidise or tax capital
investments (the choice between regimes I or II on the one side and
regime III on the other) is primarily dependent on the relative bargaining
14Figure 1: Optimal tax regimes when τ =0and λ = 1
2.
Figure 2: Optimal tax regimes when τ =0and λ =1 .
Figure 3: Optimal tax regimes when τ = 1
4 and λ = 1
2.
15strength of the trade unions. If unions are strong, then the wage gap
between the sectors is large, and an expansion of the primary sector
will have a pronounced eﬀect on both the average wage and income tax
revenues. Consequently, the optimal policy implies investment subsidies.
Conversely, if the unions are weak, the major share of the revenues
created by investment subsidies will go to the capital owners, so the
government would do better by taxing investments.
An increase in the degree of inequality aversion, β, implies a slight ex-
pansion of Regime III. If the government has very strong preferences for
income redistribution, it is important to raise suﬃcient revenue for this
purpose. A tax on investment is thus a somewhat more likely outcome.
The main eﬀect of a reduction in β is that it makes it less likely that
progressive taxation is used in conjunction with investment subsidies.
The fact that β does not play an important role for whether or not cap-
ital investments should be subsidised suggests that industrial policy of
the kind we are considering is a relatively poor instrument for achieving
income redistribution, compared to using income tax parameters.
The optimal tax policy implies proportional income taxation (Regime
II) if the unions are relatively strong, and the degree of inequality aver-
sion is relatively low. This is also quite intuitive. We know that b∗ =0
only when investments are subsidised, and this will be the case when
unions are suﬃciently strong. The primary beneﬁt of using tax revenues
to subsidise investments is an increase in the average wage. On the other
hand, the purpose of progressive taxation is income redistribution, and
the beneﬁt of redistribution is determined by β.W h e n β is relatively
low, it is more beneﬁcial for the government to use all tax revenues to
increase the average wage, by subsidising primary sector investments.
Consequently, the optimal policy implies b∗ =0if α is suﬃciently high
and β is suﬃciently low.
An increase in the proﬁtt a xr a t e ,τ, implies a contraction of Regime
III. This is very intuitive. The cost of investment taxation is the (in-
direct) loss of tax revenue when the primary sector contracts. Conse-
quently, a higher proﬁt tax rate means that this cost increases. The ﬂip
side of the coin of this argument is that when investment is subsidised, a
high proﬁt tax means that the subsidy is partly retrieved through proﬁt
taxation, which obviously makes subsidies more attractive.
We also see that an increase in λ implies an expansion of Regime II.
When the cost of income taxation increases, the optimal income tax rate
goes down. Thus, less tax revenue is generated, and, since the marginal
beneﬁt of investment subsidies is decreasing, a larger share of the tax
revenues is spent on subsidising the primary sector. Consequently, b∗ =0
for a larger set of parameter values.
16What about within-regime eﬀects of stronger concerns for income
equality? Consider Regime I, with progressive taxation and investment
subsidies. A priori, it is not obvious how a higher degree of aversion to-
wards income inequality might aﬀect the optimal policy in this regime,
in which tax revenues are used for both lump-sum transfers and invest-
ment subsidies. Should the government spend relatively more of its tax
revenues on one or the other alternative, or should total tax revenues be
increased in order to facilitate an increase in both lump-sum transfers
and investment subsidies? In the case where proﬁt taxation is not fea-
sible (i.e. τ =0 )i tc a nb es h o w n( s e ea p p e n d i xB )t h a t∂s∗
∂β < 0 and
∂t∗
∂β > 0 for the entire parameter space in Regime I. When β is not too
low, numerical simulations also suggest similar results for the case of
τ > 0. Thus, increased concerns for income equality mean that the gov-
ernment should increase income taxation, but at the same time reduce
investment subsidies, implying that a larger share of total tax revenues
is used for lump-sum transfers. Once again, this suggests that income
tax progressivity and investment subsidies are not really complementary
policy instruments with respect to achieving a more even income dis-
tribution. In our model, the main eﬀect of investment subsidies is to
increase the average post-tax income among workers, whereas income
redistribution is better achieved through progressive income taxation.
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The purpose of this paper has been to examine optimal taxation issues
in a dual economy, where labour shares in rents in a primary sector but
not in the other, secondary sector of the economy. Labour rent sharing
at the same time introduces an underinvestment problem in the primary
sector and distributional issues within the working population. How
should a benevolent planner tackle this?
Assume that we are in a situation with strong unions and a high
planner preference for income equality. Optimal policy is then to use
progressive taxation and investment subsidies in conjunction. A pure
proﬁt tax will be used to the extent this is possible, and a high proﬁtt a x
points at more investment subsidies, as the subsidy cost then to a high
degree is retrieved by the proﬁt tax. This policy package is not dissimilar
to actual policies used for example in Scandinavia in the ﬁrst decades
following World War II, and these countries were arguably marked by
strong unions and a preference for equality. ‘Progressive taxation’ here
means to tax away money from relatively high earning unionised workers
to the less fortunate, so the welfare state system should indeed by seen
as part of this ‘progressivity’. Both redistributive taxation and active
industrial policy have often been criticised as costly deviations from
17an eﬃcient economy, but here we have argued that a package of these
policies can be the optimal response to labour rent sharing, a package
that partly is meant to restore eﬃciency.
The above package of policies is not optimal in all settings, however.
Assume for example that unions are weakened. Rent-sharing is less
important within the rent-generating sector. We have then shown that
the optimal policy package is still to use progressive taxation, but now
to tax rather than subsidise investments. Proﬁt taxation is still used to
the extent that this is possible. We have assumed that the planner only
care for the income of the working population, not for that of capital
owners. With little rent-sharing, the motivation to restore eﬃciency in
the primary sector disappears: Unionised workers will nevertheless be
held down to something close to the competitive wage. A planner will
rather think of the primary sector as a tax base: He will try to capture
parts of the quasi-rents himself, on behalf of the working population,
now that the union is less able to do so. Unionised workers still earn
more than the workers in the ‘bad jobs’ of the economy, so progressive
taxation is still a relevant tool for redistribution.
Another thing that might change from the starting point with strong
unions and a high preference for equality, is that the planner’s own pref-
erence against inequality within the working population might change.
The planner is of course merely an abstraction, so if the attitudes towards
equality change in the society, this should be reﬂected in the inequality
aversion parameter that is used for policy analysis. A change in attitudes
on equality turns out mainly to be important when unions are strong
enough to make investment subsidies part of the optimal policy pack-
age. Less weight on equality will make it more likely that we combine
investment subsidies with proportional rather than progressive taxation.
Tax revenue from the income tax has two competing uses: They can be
redistributed to the working population in a lump-sum manner or used
to subsidise investment. The less weight on equality considerations, the
more likely is the corner solution where all tax revenue is used to increase
the size of the primary sector rather than for lump-sum transfers.
Lastly we want to highlight what happens if the cost of collecting
income taxes changes. We have represented tax collection costs in a
rather simple manner, but we could argue outside the model that they
are connected to the labour supply responses of people not working in
the rent-sharing sector. An increasing cost of tax collection could there-
fore mean that rent-sharing is less important, not because unions within
the rent-sharing sector are weaker, but because the rent-sharing sector
has contracted in size relative to another sector where workers earn much
simply because they are highly productive. Then labour supply issues
18will probably mean that the distortions created by income taxation be-
come more important. Crudely put, the economy might have developed
from a setting with rent-sharing unionised workers in heavy industries
to a setting with highly productive high-tech workers that are paid the
value of their marginal product. The cost of taxation might also have
increased due to globalization, with more mobile workers.
While weaker unions implied moving from investment subsidies to
investment taxes, a higher collection cost implies that the corner solution
when investment subsidies are used in combination with proportional
taxation becomes more probable. With more expensive tax collection,
there is less tax revenue available. This should point to less redistribution
and less investment subsidies. But why should this mean that it is more
likely that we are in a corner solution where only investment subsidies
and not lump-sum redistribution is chosen? The basic reason is that
the marginal beneﬁt of investment is decreasing, so with contracting tax
revenues a larger share of these revenues is used to subsidise investments.
A fuller analysis should take into account that if the reason that the
collection cost has gone up is contraction of the rent-sharing sector,
then there is also probably less need for investment subsidies. In turn,
this might imply that progressive taxation might survive as part of the
optimal policy package even in a ‘modernised’ economy.
By way of conclusion, it is interesting to discuss if the proposed poli-
cies can be characterised as ‘union busting through the tax system’?
Take as an example the situation with strong unions and strong prefer-
ences for equality. The joint policy of investment subsidies and progres-
sive taxation does of course go some way towards undoing the actions
of the unions. The primary sector wage premium that the unions have
secured is partly taken away and given to less fortunate workers. The ef-
ﬁciency loss from unionisation is also partly restored through the invest-
ment subsidy. In the long run, the incentives for workers to form unions
are weakened. This might very well be referred to as union busting, if
one chooses. The planner is assumed to care for the whole working pop-
ulation, though, so an alternative angle is to say that policy here adjusts
for the insider-outsider problem inherent in primary sector unionisation.
The interests of all workers of course cannot be worse represented when
union power is supplemented with the power to tax.
A Derivation of the Gini coeﬃcient
Let x ∈ [0,1] denote the proportion of the working population when
workers are ordered according to income, and let the function L(x)
denote the share of total income accruing to the share of the population
given by x. So, for instance, L(0.3) is the share of total income accruing
19to the 30 per cent poorest of the population. L(x) is commonly known
as the Lorenz curve. In our model, with only two types of workers, the
Lorenz curve is a piece-wise linear function with a kink at x =1− L.




L(e w1−e w2)+e w2xi f 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 − L
−
(1−L)(e w1−e w2)
L(e w1−e w2)+e w2 + e w1
L(e w1−e w2)+e w2xi f1 − L<x≤ 1
(A.1)
where e wi is the post-tax income per worker in sector i. From the Lorenz





Inserting the expression for L(x) from (A.1) into (A.2) and integrating,
yields
G =
L(1 − L)(e w1 − e w2)
(Le w1 +( 1− L) e w2)
(A.3)
Finally, substituting for e wi = wi (1 − t)+b yields
G =
L(1 − L)(w1 − w2)(1− t)
h w
(A.4)
where h w is the average post-tax income.
B Explicit expressions for the optimal solution




(1 − α + s)[tα(2 − tλ)+τ (1 − α) − s(2 − τ)]
Inserting this expression into the welfare function and maximising, yields



































































ρ =2 βα, σ =( 2− τ)
There are two possible corner solutions. If the preference for income
redistribution is suﬃciently high, and if the cost of income taxation is
suﬃciently low, the optimal solution implies t∗ =1 .I nt h i sc a s ew eﬁnd
that the optimal values of s and b are given by
s
∗ =









On the other hand, if the inequality aversion is suﬃciently low and
the unions are suﬃciently strong, the optimal solution implies b∗ =0 .
Furthermore, from the budget constraint we know that b∗ =0implies
s∗ > 0, so this particular corner solution uniquely determines Regime II.
B.1 Comparative statics in Regime I
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It is not straightforward to determine the sign of Φ and Ψ. Our approach
will be the following: First we deﬁne the set
D = {(α,β,λ):α ∈ (0,1),β ∈ (0,1),λ ∈ (0,1)}
21We will then solve Φ =0and Ψ =0for one of the parameters. The
solutions then deﬁne two sets
DΦ = {(α,β,λ):Φ =0 }
and
DΨ = {(α,β,λ):Ψ =0 }
If DΦ ∩ D = ∅, we know that Φ is either negative or positive for the
entire set of permissible parameter values, and we can then simply check
the sign by inserting numerical values for the parameters. Of course, the
same logic applies for Ψ.
Solving Φ =0for α yields a unique solution, α =0 .T h u s ,DΦ∩D =
∅. By inserting numerical values, it is straightforward to check that
Φ > 0 for all (α,β,λ) ∈ D.





























It is easily checked that λ2 < 0 and λ3 < 0 for all combinations of
α ∈ (0,1) and β ∈ (0,1).T h u s ,DΨ ∩ D = ∅. By numerical insertion
it is conﬁrmed that Ψ > 0 for all (α,β,λ) ∈ D. Thus, we conclude that
∂s∗
∂β < 0 and ∂t∗
∂β > 0 in Regime I.
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